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Journalists and Tape Recorders:
Does Participant Monitoring Invade Privacy?
by KENT R. MIDDLETON*
The tape recorder is not one of the journalist's more glamor-
ous or exotic news gathering tools. It is a simple machine,
used regularly by print and broadcast journalists covering
speeches and meetings and conducting interviews. A reporter
using a tape recorder may have to spend extra time typing
transcripts, but for many journalists the inconvenience is offset
by the accuracy of the tape, the immediacy of the resulting
journalism and the corroboration a tape provides if a reporter's
accuracy is later questioned.'
Despite its value to reporters, the tape recorder is not ac-
cepted in many cases as a proper news gathering tool. Legisla-
tors anxious to preserve the "decorum" of their proceedings
and judges fearful that electronic news gathering will result in
prejudicial publicity have traditionally barred tape recorders
from their chambers.2 In cases where the secret use of tape
recorders might invade personal privacy, the law has also been
restrictive. Federal statute and the law of many states prohibit
reporters and other private citizens from "bugging" rooms or
tapping telephones when they are not a party to the conversa-
tion.
The author would like to thank J. Laurent Scharff of Pierson, Ball & Dowd, Washing-
ton, D.C., and Donald M. Gillmor, Professor of Journalism, University of Minnesota, for
helpful comments on an earlier version of this article.
* Assistant Professor of Journalism, University of Texas, Austin, Texas; B.A.,
M.S., Michigan State University; Ph.D., University of Minnesota.
1. See Shevin v. Sunbeam Television Corp., 351 So. 2d 723, 725 (Fla. 1977), rehear-
ing denied, 435 U.S. 1018 (1978); Sigma Delta Chi v. Speaker, Maryland of Delegates,
270 Md. 1, 3, 310 A.2d 156, 159 (1973); Morris, Newsmen's Interview Techniques and Atti-
tudes Toward Interviewing, 50 JOURN. Q. 539, 540-41 (1973).
2. See Comment, The Right to Record and Broadcast Public Legislative Proceed-
ings, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 336 (1975); Sigma Delta Chi v. Speaker, Maryland House of
Delegates, 270 Md. 1, 310 A.2d 156 (1973); Scharff & Hamme, Guide to Broadcasting from
the Courtroom: A Compilation of Legal Materials Regarding Coverage of Judicial Pro-
ceedings by the Electronic Media (unpublished report, June 1978).
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-11 (1968). Some states have incorporated federal prohibitions
against bugging and wiretapping into their own statutes, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 803-
42 (Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626A.02 (West Supp. 1979); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 250
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As the concern for individual privacy has increased over the
last two decades,4 pressure has mounted to prohibit secret
"consensual" tape recording, recording in which the person
monitoring the conversation is also a party to it. Thirteen
states now bar consensual recording, either in person or over
the telephone, by private individuals.' In a case in Florida
brought by the media, the Florida Supreme Court upheld a
state statute prohibiting tape recording unless all parties to the
conversation consent.6 Thus journalists, who have often used
hidden tape recorders and transmitters to expose prostitution,
bookmaking, illegal drug sales, fraudulent land deals, question-
able fund raising procedures and other vice and misconduct,
are gradually being denied an effective news gathering tool.
It is doubtful that many in the media are aware of the grad-
ual erosion of reporters' power to carry out investigations
within the law using secret tape recorders. Standard media
law texts say little about the law of tape recorders.' The most
comprehensive law journal article on consensual monitoring,
now twelve years old, did not address the issues of special
interest to journalists or their legal counsel.' The law itself de-
(McKinney 1975). Some states prohibit wiretapping only, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 37, 8-210
(1975); IDAHO CODE § 18-6705 (1979). Other states have not legislated on wiretapping or
bugging, e.g., Texas, Utah and Vermont.
4. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Privacy Act of 1974, Pub.
L. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976)); A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON
PRIVACY (1971); A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967).
5. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 631-32 (West Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 1335
(revised 1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03 (Supp. 1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-3001 (1978);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 14-2 (Smith-Hurd 1979); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-
402 (1980); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 1970); MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN.
§ 750.539c (1968); MONT. REV. CODES § 94-8-114 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570 A:2
(Replacement 1974); OR. REV. STAT. § 165.540 (Replacement 1977); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5702 (Purdon Supp. 1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.73.030 (Supp. 1979). Some
of these states prohibit consensual monitoring by police as well as by private citizens
unless the police are operating under a valid warrant. In a few of these states private
individuals, such as reporters, can engage in consensual monitoring despite prohibi-
tive statutes because of exceptions in the statutes or because of judicial interpretation
of the statutes. See notes 92-101 infra, and accompanying text.
6. Shevin v. Sunbeam Television Corp., 351 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1977).
7. M. FRANKLIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MASS MEDIA LAw 94-99 (1977); D. GILL-
MOR, MASS COMMUNICATION LAw 349-51 (3d ed. 1979); D. GINSBURG, REGULATION OF
BROADCASTING (1979); H. NELSON & D. TEETER, LAW OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS 167-71
(1978); D. PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAW 183-84 (1977).
8. Greenawalt, The Consent Problem in Wiretapping and Eavesdropping: Surrep-
titious Monitoring with the Consent of a Participant in a Conversation, 68 COLUM. L.
REV. 189 (1968). See also R. GREENAWALT, LEGAL PROTECTIONS OF PRIVACY, REPORT TO
THE OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 30-38 (1975); Amsterdam, Perspectives on
the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 402-03 (1974). Other useful articles which
COMM/ENT [Vol. 2288
JOURNALISTS & TAPE RECORDERS
fies easy understanding, and is scattered among court deci-
sions, federal and state statutes, Federal Communications
Commission rules and telephone company tariffs. It is no won-
der one network's production standards say consensual moni-
toring with a radio transmitter is prohibited, while another
network's standards say it is not.' Even media representatives
interested in developments in the law affecting tape recorders
may have been preoccupied by United States Supreme Court
decisions expanding the powers of libel plaintiffs,"o allowing
unannounced newsroom searches," and denying the confiden-
tiality of journalists' sources. 12
The purpose of the first two parts of this article is to define
the law regulating the surreptitious use of tape recorders. The
first section will discuss "third-party" recording, or recording
by a person who is not a party to a conversation. The second
section will discuss the law of consensual monitoring. The
third section will discuss newsreporters and privacy and will
argue that consensual monitoring by journalists or other pri-




There are four kinds of surreptitious recording in which the
press can engage without becoming party to a conversation or
without having permission of one of the parties to the conver-
deal with consensual monitoring include: Enker, Controls on Electronic Eavesdrop-
ping-A Basic Distinction, 2 ISRAEL L. REV. 461 (1967); Lipset, The Wiretapping-Eaves-
dropping Problem: A Private Investigator's View, 44 MINN. L. REV. 873 (1960); Note,
Electronic Surveillance in California: A Study in State Legislative Control, 57 CALIF.
L. REV. 1182 (1969); Seymour, Recording Telephone Conversations: The Problem of Par-
ticipant Monitoring, 8 J. BEVERLY HILLs B.A. 47 (May-June 1974). See also NATIONAL
COMM. FOR THE REVIEW OF FED. & STATE LAW RELATING TO WIRETAPPING & ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE, REPORT: ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 111-19, 171-72 (1976).
9. Compare CBS Production Standards, Electronic Eavesdropping, V. (a) with
NBC's policy on Interceptions-Eavesdropping. The author is grateful to Sanford
Socolow, Executive Producer, CBS Evening News, for providing the Production Stan-
dards, and to J. Marshall Wellborn, Assistant General Attorney, National Broadcasting
Co., for providing his news department's policy on Interceptions-Eavesdropping as
well as many insightful comments during several telephone interviews.
10. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
11. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
12. New Jersey v. Jascalevich (In re Farber), 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330 (1978).
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sation to record. A reporter can tap a phone, bug a room, moni-
tor nonpublic radio broadcasts, or eavesdrop. Wiretapping and
bugging are illegal for the media. Monitoring and divulging
nonpublic radio broadcasts are prohibited, but frequently prac-
ticed without penalty. Eavesdropping, or recording conversa-
tions that one can overhear with the unaided ear, is
permissible in public and semi-public places, though seldom
practiced.
A. Wiretapping and Bugging
Wiretapping and bugging are similar in that they permit the
overhearing and recording of conversations without the knowl-
edge of any parties to the conversation. A wiretap usually in-
volves a physical intrusion into a telephone wire, permitting
the interception of a conversation between the sender and the
receiver. Bugging is the placement of a recording or transmit-
ting device in a place where the person doing the monitoring
will not be.
For many years the law of wiretapping and bugging was
based on a property theory that failed to acknowledge the in-
trusiveness of electronic technology. During this period, the
Supreme Court interpreted literally citizens' Fourth Amend-
ment rights "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures." 13 Thus
the Court would find wiretapping or bugging by law enforce-
ment officers did not invade a person's privacy unless there
was a physical intrusion or trespass into a protected space. In
its first wiretapping case, Olmstead v. United States,14 the
Supreme Court upheld a conviction based on evidence from a
warrantless tap on Olmstead's phone. Olmstead argued the
conversations should not have been admitted into evidence be-
cause the tap outside his home constituted an illegal search
and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. However,
the Court stated, "[t]here was no searching. There was no
seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of
hearing and that only. There was no entry of the houses or
offices of the defendants."'
The property theory of privacy remained despite section 605
of the Federal Communications Act of 1934, which provides
13. U.S. CONST., amend. IV.
14. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
15. Id. at 464.
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that "no person not being authorized by the sender shall inter-
cept any communications and divulge or publish the existence,
content . .. or meaning of such intercepted commutication.""e
Although the Supreme Court ruled that evidence gained
through wiretaps in violation of section 605 would not be ad-
missible in federal courts,1 7 federal law enforcement officers
conducted warrantless taps for years on the theory (never
tested in court) that a violation of section 605 required both an
"interception" and a "divulgence."" Federal officials reasoned
that as long as the contents of a tap were passed around only
among other federal officials, there was no "divulgence," and
thus no violation of section 605. Unless law enforcement of-
ficers committed a trespass or physical intrusion into a pro-
tected area, neither the Fourth Amendment nor section 605
barred wiretapping and bugging.19
Spurred by a barrage of judicial dissent,2 0 the Court gradu-
ally shifted away from its property interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment. In 1963, the Court ruled that a conversation could
be "seized."2 1 Four years -later, it held that an overly broad
eavesdropping statute was unconstitutional because it re-
sulted in "trespassory intrusion into a constitutionally pro-
16. Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 605, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), current version at 47 U.S.C. § 605
(Supp. 11 1978).
17. Nardonne v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
18. See, e.g., Brownell, The Public Security and Wire Tapping, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 195,
197-99 (1954).
19. In Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), the Court ruled that officers
could put an electronic "detectaphone" on the wall to overhear a conversation in an
adjoining office. In Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), the Court held that
insertion of a spike microphone into the wall so that it made contact with a heating
duct, allowing officers to hear conversations throughout the house, was an "unautho-
rized physical penetration into the premises" in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 509.
20. In his famous dissent in Olmstead, Mr. Justice Brandeis warned that "[w ays
may some day be developed by which the Government, without removing papers from
secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose
to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home." 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting). To Brandeis, the authors of the Fourth Amendment did not in-
tend to protect only a citizen's property and physical possessions. Rather, Brandeis
argued, the framers "sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their
emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right
to be left alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civi-
lized men." Id. at 478. See also On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1952)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 447-50 (1963) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
21. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963).
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tected area."2 2 That same year, 1967, the Court in Katz v.
United States said baldly that the Fourth Amendment does not
protect property only, but protects individual privacy.2 3 No
longer would trespass or physical intrusion be required for a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
In Katz, the Court held inadmissible evidence about gam-
bling gained through an FBI bug and recording device placed
on the outside of a public telephone booth. In an often-quoted
passage, Mr. Justice Stewart wrote for the Court:
[TIhe Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home
or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection....
But what he seeks to perserve as private, even in an area ac-
cessible to the public may be constitutionally protected.24
The government's electronic monitoring and recording "vio-
lated the privacy upon which he [the defendant] justifiably re-
lied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a
'search and seizure.' "25
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan agreed that the
Fourth Amendment protects people, but he argued that deter-
mining the scope of the protection generally "requires refer-
ence to a 'place.' "26 How is the Court to determine if a person
"justifiably relied" on the privacy of a certain place? Justice
Harlan suggested a two-fold requirement: "that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable.' "27
Now that electronic eavesdropping could violate the Fourth
Amendment without any physical intrusion or trespass onto a
protected area, Congress quickly passed legislation defining
the circumstances under which law enforcement officers, oper-
ating under judicial authorization, could conduct wiretapping
and bugging. Following guidelines established by the
Supreme Court in Berger v. New York,2 8 Congress included in
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 de-
tailed procedures to be followed by law enforcement officers
22. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 44 (1967).
23. 389 U.S. 347, 353.
24. Id. at 351-52.
25. Id. at 353.
26. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
27. Id.
28. 388 U.S. 41, 55-60 (1967).
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obtaining warrants to conduct bugging and wiretapping.29
The Omnibus Crime Control Act specifically prohibited wire-
tapping and bugging by private parties such as the press.30 Not
being part of the law enforcement machinery, the press cannot
conduct such third-party monitoring under a search warrant.
The reason for permitting wiretapping and bugging only under
the most carefully structured judicial overview was perhaps
best stated by Mr. Justice Douglas in his concurrence in Ber-
ger. Bugging, Douglas wrote, "places a government agent in
the bedroom, in the business conference, in the social hour, in
the lawyer's office-"" To Douglas, this third-party monitoring
was more offensive even than placing a policeman in the home
because the homeowner is completely unaware of the invasion
of privacy. The traditional wiretap or electronic eavesdropping
device constitutes a dragnet, sweeping in all conversations
within its scope-without regard to the participants or the na-
ture of the conversations. It intrudes upon the privacy of those
not even suspected of crime and intercepts the most intimate
of conversations. 32
In those few instances where members of the press have dis-
covered themselves to be the subject of unannounced third-
party monitoring, they, too, have felt the special intrusion of
eavesdropping that makes no distinctions between guilty and
innocent parties or between personal and conspiratorial con-
versations.33
B. Nonpublic Radio Broadcasts
A third kind of third-party monitoring is the listening to, and
29. Pub. L. No. 90-351,82 Stat. 212 (1968), as amended by Act of Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 930 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1976)) [hereinafter cited
as the Omnibus Crime Control Act].
30. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1976).
31. 388 U.S. 41, 64-65 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 65. For a similar view of the insidiousness of third party bugging and
wiretapping, see the Brandeis dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 475-76
(1928).
33. See Warrantless Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance-1974: Joint Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Ad. Prac. & Proc. and the Subcomm. on Const. Rights of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Surveillance of the Senate
Comm. on For. Rel., 93rd Cong., 2d sess. 382-83 (testimony of Washington columnist
Joseph Kraft). See also Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 949 (1979) (held: no
violation of reporters' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights for telephone company




recording of, nonpublic radio broadcasts. Many newsrooms
have radio receivers on which journalists monitor police, fire
and other emergency radio transmissions. If a fire, accident or
other emergency appears newsworthy, a reporter and camera
crew can be dispatched to the scene. Sometimes emergency
broadcasts are not used simply as a news tip, but are recorded
and included in news broadcasts.
Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act, which states
that "[njo person not being authorized by the sender shall in-
tercept any radio communication and divulge or publish" its
contents, excludes from its prohibition the interception and di-
vulgence of broadcasts transmitted to the general public, com-
munications transmitted by amateurs or others for use of the
general public or communications which relate to ships in dis-
tress." Thus, the interception of nonpublic broadcasts is pro-
hibited.
In what is apparently the only reported prosecution of a
news gathering agency under section 605, the Federal District
Court for the Northern District of California refused a motion
to dismiss by a defendant who gave police and fire messages to
an Oakland, California, radio station." The defendant claimed
the police and fire messages were broadcast by amateurs or
others for use by the general public, and thus were exempt
from the prohibitions of section 605. The district court, after
reviewing the powers given by Congress to the FCC to regulate
the use of radio by government safety agencies, concluded that
Congress "intended to protect messages of public safety radio
services from interception and divulgement by any person, in-
cluding the press, until the public safety agency using the
means of communication authorized the release of the
message."3 6
The Federal Communications Commission has also inter-
preted section 605 as prohibiting the use of emergency radio
broadcasts without permission of the public safety agency
making the original transmission. In one case, the FCC said
that section 605 prohibits monitoring Federal Aviation Admin-
istration broadcasts for information about events "worthy of
34. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976). "Intercept" is usually defined as the "aural acquisition
of the contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any electronic,
mechanical, or other device." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1976).
35. United States v. Fuller, 202 F. Supp. 356 (N.D. Cal. 1962).
36. Id. at 359.
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on-the-spot news coverage" and subsequent use of such broad-
casts "either in verbatim form or in news bulletins."3 7 The
FCC issued the opinion because commercial broadcasters and
others were monitoring FAA broadcasts during a spate of
hijackings in the early 1970's. Sometimes broadcasters broad-
cast the FAA transmissions to the public live; sometimes the
commercial broadcasters taped the FAA transmissions for
later broadcast.
The FCC was bothered because widespread public dissemi-
nation of FAA radio transmissions could hamper law enforce-
ment activities during a hijacking, jeopardize lives, and tip off
hijackers to the methods used by law enforcement officers."
The Commission recognized the "strong public interest in the
free gathering and dissemination of news," but also recognized
the "strong public interest in public safety."3 9 The FCC told
licensees they "should contact FAA officials who are author-
ized to grant the necessary authority for interception and di-
vulgence of FAA air-ground communications."40 The FCC
singled out no broadcaster for reprimand or penalty. The Com-
mission simply admonished licensees to "give all due consider-
ation to the conditions imposed" and pointed out the penalties
authorized by section 605.1
Several years earlier, the FCC had issued a similar state-
ment when it was apparent that broadcasters were using police
and fire broadcasts for news. The FCC warned that such use of
emergency broadcasts attracted crowds to the scene of emer-
gencies, hampered the movement of emergency vehicles and
helped fugitives to escape.4 2 Apparently appealing to broad-
casters' sense of morality, the FCC concluded:
Because of their ability to report news instantaneously, broad-
37. Unauthorized Broadcast of Federal Aviation Administration Communications
by Broadcast and Other Federal Communications Commission Licensees, 23 Rad. Reg.
2d (P&F) 1720-21 (1972).
38. Id. at 1721.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1720.
41. Id. at 1721. Violation of § 605 is punishable by a fine of up to $10,000 and a year
in jail. 47 U.S.C. § 501 (1976). Violation of an FCC rule is punishable by a fine of $500
for each day of the violation. Id. at § 502. Broadcast licensees at the time were also
subject to forfeitures of $1,000 a day up to a total of $10,000. Id. at § 503(b). In 1978,
amendments to the Federal Communications Act increased the forfeitures and ex-
panded FCC jurisdiction to impose forfeitures beyond broadcast licensees. Pub. L. No.
95-234, § 2, 92 Stat. 33 (1978). See note 130, infra.
42. Monitoring of Police and Fire Radio Transmissions by Broadcast Stations, 1
Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 291 (1963).
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cast stations, even apart from the prohibitions of Section 605,
have a responsibility beyond that of other news media to make
sure that their news bulletins do not compromise the public
safety.43
C. Eavesdropping
A fourth method of third-party monitoring is simple eaves-
dropping; listening to, and perhaps recording or transmitting, a
conversation whichone can easily overhear. This category is
different from wiretapping or bugging in which the monitor is
removed from the conversation and could not hear the conver-
sation with the unaided ear. The eavesdropper is close enough
to a conversation to overhear it, but he is not a party to the
conversation. This form of electronic eavesdropping is rela-
tively rare for reporters, but it could occur where a reporter
overhears and records a conversation at the next table in a res-
taurant or in the next room in a motel. Generally speaking,
recording what one can overhear is legal providing the eaves-
dropper does not trespass, does not intrude into a private area
and does not use amplifying equipment.
Since colonial times, law and custom have barred the eaves-
dropper and peeping tom." Positioning oneself by a door or
crouching below an open window in order to hear a conversa-
tion within, and peering into someone's windows are all pro-
hibited activities. Such snooping may constitute trespass, an
invasion of privacy, or both." Several states prohibit loitering
for the purpose of eavesdropping.
However, there is a long-standing principle, restated by the
Supreme Court in Katz, that "[w]hat a person knowingly ex-
poses to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection."" A moonshiner
has no Fourth Amendment claims to privacy if federal revenue
43. Id. at 292. Some state statutes which prohibit tape recording without the con-
sent of all parties make exemptions for the monitoring and recording of emergency
broadcasts by hospitals, clinics, fire fighting agencies and other emergency bureaus.
E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 14-3(d) (Smith-Hurd 1979). But a Florida newspaper pho-
tographer was arrested merely for having a police radio scanner in his car. See EDITOR
& PUBLISHER (Jan. 20, 1979) at 46, col. 1.
44. A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM, 333-34 (1967).
45. Souder v. Pendleton Detectives, Inc., 88 So. 2d 716 (La. App. 1956).
46. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-15-02-2 (Replacement Vol. 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 1202 (West 1951).
47. 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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officers observe his furtive movements in an open field.4 8 Simi-
larly, a news reporter is not barred by common law from film-
ing what he can easily see from a public sidewalk, 4 ' although
that public surveillance may become tortious if it is "overzeal-
ous,"50 or if it degenerates into harassment."
The same principle applies to aural exposure.
"[C] onversations carried on in a tone of voice quite audible to
a person standing outside . .. are conversations knowingly ex-
posed to the public."5 2 A law enforcement officeri does not vio-
late a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights when he
overhears a call on a public telephone from a distance of four
feet." Detectives do not invade the privacy of drug dealers
when they overhear the criminals in the next motel room."
Such eavesdropping may not be genteel behavior, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals has said, but law enforcement officers
cannot be expected to shut their ears where there is no tres-
pass and no artificial means of probing.55 Similarly, a salesman
may record one end of a competitor's telephone conversation
in an adjoining hospitality suite if the monitor does not use am-
plification or assume a contrived position. 6
If reporters can generally assume it is legal to record what
can easily be overheard, they must still remember the
Supreme Court's admonition in Katz, that "even in an area ac-
cessible to the public," what a person "seeks to preserve as pri-
vate" may be protected.57 Two old Massachusetts cases give
conflicting views on what privacy one should expect when con-
versing in public places. In one case there was no invasion of
48. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
49. Channel 10, Inc. v. Gunnarson, 337 F. Supp. 634 (D. Minn. 1972); Taylor v.
K.T.V.B., 96 Idaho 202, 525 P.2d 984 (1974).
50. Nader v. General Motors, 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1970).
The New York Court of Appeals said it was proper for the trial court to decide whether
the consumer advocate had acted in such a way at a bank that a "casual observer"
could see the denomination of bills Nader was receiving or if there was an intrusion
because of "overzealous" surveillance. Id. at 570, 255 N.E.2d at 771, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
See also Pinkerton National Detective Agency, Inc. v. Stevens, 108 Ga. App. 159, 132
S.E.2d 119 (1963). See note 108, infra.
51. Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995 (2d Cir. 1975).
52. United States v. Llanes, 398 F.2d 880, 884 (2d Cir. 1968).
53. United States v. McLeod, 493 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1974).
54. United States v. Fisch, 474 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921
(1973).
55. Id. at 1076-77.
56. United States v. Carroll, 337 F. Supp. 1260, 1263 (D.D.C. 1971).
57. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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privacy when a couple was easily overheard while talking in a
train station." In another case, however, a couple overheard
on the street had an expectation of privacy because none of the
"passers-by or persons in the vicinity paid any attention to
them or even could hear the words.""
A few states have taken some of the guessing out of a re-
porter's decision to record a conversation he overhears at a
public gathering. A California statute which prohibits the re-
cording of "confidential" conversations without the consent of
all parties, does not prohibit recording at public proceedings or
in other circumstances "in which the parties to the communi-
cation may reasonably expect that the communication may be
overheard or recorded." 0 This provision, and others like it, is
consistent with the general principle of news gathering that
the press is free to report what it acquires at public proceed-
ings.6' If a reporter is recording an overheard conversation in
more private places, the legality of his activity may well de-
pend on whether he has to trespass or position himself unnatu-
rally to make the recording.
If a reporter is not merely recording a conversation he over-
hears, but is using a "radio device" to transmit the conversa-
tion to a recorder elsewhere, he comes under Federal
Communication Commission regulations as well as section 605.
In its 1966 Report and Order on the Use of Radio Devices for
Eavesdropping, the Commission prohibited eavesdropping by
58. Linnell v. Linnell, 249 Mass. 51, 143 N.E. 813 (1924).
59. Freeman v. Freeman, 238 Mass. 150, 161-62, 130 N.E. 220, 222 (1921).
60. CAL. PENAL CODE § 632(c) (West Supp. 1979). ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 14-3(c)
(Smith-Hurd 1979) exempts from the statute's prohibition of taping without the con-
sent of all parties,
[a]ny broadcast by radio, television or otherwise whether it be a broadcast or
recorded for the purpose of later broadcasts of any function where the public
is in attendance and the conversations are overheard incidental to the main
purpose for which such broadcasts are then being made.
Washington, which requires the consent of all parties to a taped conversation, permits
recording of an overheard conversation at a public meeting if the participants in the
conversation know that recording equipment is present:
An employee of any regularly published newspaper, magazine, wire service,
radio station, or television station acting in the course of bona fide news gath-
ering duties on a full time or contractual or part time basis, shall be deemed to
have consent to record and divulge communications or conversations other-
wise prohibited by this chapter if the consent is expressly given or if the re-,
cording or transmitting device is readily apparent or obvious to the speakers.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.73.030(4) (Supp. 1979).
61. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
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means of any device required to be licensed by the FCC.6 2 The
FCC's eavesdropping rules, if heeded, could restrict the use of
radio transmitters for consensual or participant monitoring.
However, those rules are in accord with federal and state laws
permitting secret recording of conversations easily overheard.
When a person overhears a conversation within "earshot," the
Commission said, he can transmit that conversation secretly if
it occurs in "public and semipublic places . .. where persons
may reasonably expect their conversations to be overheard."6 4
Summary
Reporters are specifically prohibited by statute from engag-
ing in third-party wiretapping and bugging. They are also for-
bidden under section 605 and FCC directive from monitoring or
recording and divulging non-public radio broadcasts. Gener-




Of more importance to the reporter than the law regulating
third-party monitoring is the law affecting consensual monitor-
ing. Investigative reporters seldom wish to engage in illegal
wiretapping or bugging, and seldom do situations arise where a
reporter wants both to eavesdrop on a conversation and to rec-
ord it. But a reporter may want to record a conversation to
which he, or someone with whom he has made prior arrange-
62. Use of low power communications devices not requiring a license was also pro-
hibited. 2 F.C.C.2d 641, 6 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1691 (1966). The Commission's order was
codified in 47 C.F.R. §§ 2.701 & 15.11 (1978). These two identical rules prohibit anyone
from "either directly or indirectly" using a device "required to be licensed by section
301" of the Federal Communications Act for overhearing or recording "the private con-
versations of the other unless such use is authorized by all parties engaging in conver-
sations."
Section 301 of the Act, 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1976), gives the FCC power over radio trans-
missions broadcast (b) from one state to another or (d) within any state when the
effects of the broadcast extend beyond the borders of the state. Subsection (d) would
certainly apply to much network broadcasting. Low power transmitters in the range of
one watt are included in the eavesdropping prohibition of 47 C.F.R. § 15.104 (1978).
An "indirect" transmission prohibited by the FCC would include a conversation
picked up by a spike microphone-which is not a radio device-and then transmitted
by radio to a recorder. 2 F.C.C.2d 641, 645, 6 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1691, 1696 (1966).
63. See notes 121-31, infra, and accompanying text.
64. 2 F.C.C.2d 641, 645, 6 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1691, 1696 (1966).
ments, is a party. Both forms of recording are called consen-
sual monitoring because at least one party to the conversation
has given his consent to the recording. A television station, for
example, which plants a transmitter on a prostitute and then
secretly films and records her conversation with a pimp is en-
gaging in consensual monitoring. Consensual monitoring is
permitted under federal law and in the majority of the states,
but more and more states are prohibiting this kind of investiga-
tive reporting. Several special considerations apply where a
participant records a telephone conversation, particularly if
that recording is to be broadcast.
A. Constitutional Background and Federal Law
Before passage of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968,' the Supreme Court had held that consen-
sual monitoring by law enforcement officers did not violate a
citizen's Fourth Amendment rights. As in the wiretapping and
bugging cases, the Court before Katz could find no Fourth
Amendment violation in participant monitoring unless there
was a trespass or physical intrusion.6
The principle behind these federal cases is that a person
does not have to trust the person to whom he talks. Not only
may one's auditor tell third parties what was told to him, the
auditor may also record or transmit the conversation while it is
taking place. For constitutional purposes, the Court has seen
no difference between repeating what one has heard, recording
it, or transmitting it simultaneously to third parties.
In the first consensual monitoring case in 1952, On Lee v.
United States, 67 Chin Poy, an old acquaintance and former em-
ployee of On Lee, entered On Lee's laundry. During a conver-
sation in the customer's room, On Lee made incriminating
statements. On Lee did not know that his old friend was trans-
mitting the conversation to a narcotics agent outside the laun-
dry. On the strength of the agent's testimony, On Lee was
convicted.
Relying on the property theory of the Fourth Amendment,
the Supreme Court ruled 5 to 4 that neither Chin Poy nor the
monitor violated the Fourth Amendment because neither was
65. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 930 (1970), codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1976).
66. See notes 13-29, supra, and accompanying text.
67. 343 U.S. 747.
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a trespasser. Chin Poy had entered the laundry with On Lee's
consent, and had conducted the conversation in a public part of
the laundry. "It would be a dubious service to the genuine lib-
erties protected by the Fourth Amendment," Mr. Justice Jack-
son wrote for the majority, "to make them bedfellows with
spurious liberties improvised by farfetched analogies which
would liken eavesdropping on a conversation, with the conni-
vance of one of the parties, to an unreasonable search or
seizure.""
The second significant pre-Katz decision dealing with con-
sensual monitoring was Lopez v. United States.6 9 In this 1963
case, the Supreme Court held admissible at trial the tape of a
conversation between a tavern operator and an Internal Reve-
nue agent equipped with a Minifon, a miniature wire recorder.
The Supreme Court did not regard the warrantless recording
in the tavern operator's office as "eavesdropping" because "the
Government did not use an electronic device to listen in on
conversations it could not otherwise have heard. Instead, the
device was used only to obtain the most reliable evidence pos-
sible of a conversation in which the Government's own agent
was a participant and which that agent was fully entitled to dis-
close."" "We think," Justice Harlan continued for the Court,
"the risk that petitioner took in offering a bribe to [agent] Da-
vis fairly included the risk that the offer would be accurately
reproduced in court, whether by faultless memory or mechani-
cal recording.""
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Goldberg,
dissented, arguing that a private citizen should not have to
take a risk that his auditor might record a conversation. We all
take the risk that our auditors might reveal the contents of a
conversation, Brennan wrote,
[bjut the risk which both On Lee and today's decision impose
is of a different order. It is the risk that third parties, whether
mechanical auditors like the Minifon or human transcribers of
mechanical transmissions as in On Lee-third parties who can-
not be shut out of a conversation as conventional eavesdrop-
pers can be, merely by a lowering of voices, or withdrawing to a
private place-may give independent evidence of any conver-
sation. There is only one way to guard against such a risk, and
68. Id. at 754.
69. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
70. Id. at 439.
71. Id.
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that is to keep one's mouth shut on all occasions.72
In three other cases decided in 1966, the Supreme Court
again approved consensual monitoring. In one, a federal agent,
posing as the friend of a mutual acquaintance, illegally bought
drugs at a private home.73 There was no recording or transmis-
sion, but the agent's testimony was admitted into evidence. In
another case, which also did not involve a tape recording, a fed-
eral agent was admitted to James Hoffa's hotel suite where the
agent, who was an old "friend" of Hoffa's, overheard discus-
sions about attempts to tamper with a jury." In the third case,
the Supreme Court held admissible a tape made by an off-duty
policeman of a conversation he had with a lawyer in the law-
yer's office. During the conversation, the lawyer offered to
bribe a juror.
Although these pre-Katz consensual monitoring cases ap-
plied only to federal law enforcement officers, rather than to
members of the private media, the federal cases establish the
framework in which debate about private consensual monitor-
ing takes place. The federal consensual monitoring cases, like
the third-party monitoring cases discussed in the previous sec-
tion, establish several principles: that one does not have to
trust him whom he talks to; that for constitutional purposes,
divulging confidences learned from another through recording
or transmission is no different from divulging them-orally from
memory; that private places, such as a home or lawyer's office,
are no longer sanctuaries when the owner/occupier conducts
illegal business there.
Also of importance to the media, to private investigators and
to others with an interest in consensual monitoring, was the
72. Id. at 450 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
73. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966). "During neither of his visits to peti-
tioner's home did the agent see, hear, or take anything that was not contemplated, and
in fact intended, by petitioner as a necessary part of his illegal business." Id. at 210.
74. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). "What the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects is the security a man relies upon when he places himself or his property within a
constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his auto-
mobile." Id. at 301. But Hoffa, the Court said, "was not relying on the security of the
hotel room; he was relying upon his misplaced confidence that [agent] Partin would
not reveal his wrongdoing." Id. at 302.
75. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966). Two federal district judges author-
ized FBI agents to conceal a recorder on the off-duty policeman's person for his conver-
sation with the lawyer. Writing for the court, Mr. Justice Stewart said that the
"indiscriminate" use of tape recorders had not been authorized. Rather, the procedure
of antecedent justification before a magistrate was clearly met. Id. at 329-30.
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increasing undercurrent of discontent in these decisions from
a divided Court.76 The pressure to abandon the property anal-
ysis of the Fourth Amendment in favor of an individual privacy
analysis was becoming irresistible. Members of the press who
believed in the importance of investigative reporters being
able to engage in surreptitious monitoring could not help but
feel uneasy in the knowledge that the "liberals" on the court-
Justices Douglas, Brennan and Goldberg, the staunchest sup-
porters of freedom of speech and the press-were leading the
movement to view the Fourth Amendment as a personal right
of privacy instead of a property right. Whatever First Amend-
ment right might be claimed by the press to engage in secret
consensual monitoring-although the media asserted none
during this period-it would be more difficult to assert that
right if it were to conflict with a fundamental right of privacy
rather than a property right.
When the Katz decision was handed down in 1967, several
justices and commentators thought the earlier consensual
monitoring cases would no longer be good law.77 Now that the
Fourth Amendment protected people, rather than places,
would law enforcement officers violate an individual's right to
privacy if they secretly recorded conversations with a suspect?
Would prohibitions on consensual monitoring by law enforce-
ment officers be extended to private individuals, such as re-
porters, whose activites do not fall within Fourth Amendment
strictures?
Congress clarified the issue the following year in the Omni-
bus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Consensual
monitoring both by law enforcement officers and by private cit-
izens was not unlawful, provided that the conversations were
not being intercepted "for the purpose of committing any crim-
inal or tortious act."7 1Mr. Justice Harlan suggested that Con-
gress, in the Omnibus Crime Control Act, was only conforming
to Supreme Court standards, not endorsing consensual moni-
toring.79 Congress, however, seemed to support the surrepti-
tious use of tape recorders. The purpose of the Act was to
allow law enforcement officers to fight organized crime, much
76. See note 20, supra, and text accompanying note 71, supra.
77. See, e.g., United States v. White, 405 F.2d 838 (1969); United States v. White, 401
U.S. 745, 756 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2) (d) (1976).
79. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 791 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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of which is conducted orally. 0
Three years later, in United States v. White,a' the Supreme
Court again upheld its commitment to consensual monitoring
by police, but the decision of the Court, written by Justice
White, was joined only by Justices Stewart and Blackmun.
The Court held admissible testimony of an agent who over-
heard a conversation transmitted by a police informant con-
versing with a suspect in a car. Support on the court for
consensual monitoring may be waning,82 but Katz has not re-
versed the principle that one can not necessarily trust his audi-
tor not to reveal a conversation, either from memory or from an
electronic recording.
B. State Statutes Prohibiting Consensual Monitoring
While the Supreme Court appears to lessen its support for
consensual monitoring by police without a warrant, many state
legislatures have already outlawed the practice. In 1966, the Il-
linois Supreme Court interpreted a statute permitting consen-
sual monitoring as prohibiting the admission into evidence of a
80. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in [19681 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2112, 2157. The use by police of wiretapping and bugging equipment with prior
judicial authorization as well as warrantless consensual monitoring by both police and
private citizens as permitted by the Act have been endorsed by the National Commis-
sion for the Review of Federal and State Laws Relating to Wiretapping and Electronic
Surveillance which was created by the Omnibus Crime Control Act. See note 8, supra.
An approved draft of an update to the American Bar Association's Standards Relating
to the Administration of Criminal Justice: Electronic Surveillance, also supports con-
sensual monitoring by both law enforcement personnel and private citizens. See also
Standards 2-4.1 & 2-5.1-17 (1978).
81. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
82. Justice Black concurred in the decision because he did not consider monitor-
ing conversations with tape recorders as a "search and seizure" properly falling under
the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 754. Justice Brennan joined the plurality in the result
only because the monitoring occurred before Katz, and he was opposed to a retroac-
tive application of Katz. He further suggested that Lopez and On Lee are no longer
sound law after Katz. Id. at 755.
Justices Douglas and Marshall dissented, also arguing that On Lee was not good law
after Katz. Id. at 756-68 (Douglas, J., dissenting), 795-96 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Harlan dissented, not because he objected to the use of informants, but because
he objected to the secret transmission of conversations to third parties. Id. at 768-95.
The risk of direct electronic transmission rather than an oral report from memory
might inhibit spontaneity, particularly of the off-hand conversation which is easily for-
gotten, Harlan argued. Id. at 787-88. Justice Harlan would require a search warrant
prior to transmission of a conversation. He suggested that a tape recording might be
different from the third-party simultaneous monitoring and that the relationship be-
tween the informer and the suspect might provide the basis for even further distinc-
tions. Id. at 788 n.24.
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tape recorded with the consent of only one party to a conversa-
tion," thereby becoming the first state to effectively prohibit
monitoring without consent. By 1980 thirteen states, including
Illinois, have followed with legislation prohibiting participant
monitoring by private individuals, and, in many states, by po-
lice as well.84
In Florida, the only state where a statute requiring all parties
to consent has been challenged by the news media, the state
supreme court upheld the statute." The Sunbeam Television
Corporation and the Miami Herald, appellees, claimed that the
statute impaired the gathering and dissemination of news and
therefore constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint. Tape
recorders, the media argued, are necessary for accuracy, can-
dor and corroboration. The media argued further that the pri-
vacy issues used to justify the all-party-consent requirement
were subordinate to the First Amendment rights of the media,
which in turn, serve an important public function. 6
The Florida Supreme Court ruled that the press has no
rights beyond those of the public to gather, disseminate or
withhold information. To allow the media to secretly wire par-
ticipants to a conversation would establish a private system of
informers which "would pose a threat to the citizen's justifiable
expectations of privacy."7
The Florida court dismissed the claim that the ban on con-
sensual monitoring was a prior restraint. The statute prohibits
nothing from being published, the court said, nor does it com-
mand that anything be published. The all-party-consent re-
quirement, in the court's view, is simply a policy decision
appropriately made by the legislature." Furthermore, the
First Amendment does not include a right to "corroborate
83. People v. Kurth, 34 Ill. 2d 387, 216 N.E.2d 154 (1966).
84. For a listing of the thirteen states, see note 5, supra. Several states that pro-
hibit consensual monitoring make an exception for police. E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 633
(West 1970); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-402(2) (1980). The Michigan all-
party-consent requirement makes an exception for law enforcement officers, MICH.
COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.539g(a) (West 1968), but the Michigan Supreme Court held
inadmissible evidence gained by Michigan policemen listening to a conversation
secretly transmitted by an informant. People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511
(1975).
85. Shevin v. Sunbeam Television Corp., 351 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1977).
86. Id. at 725.
87. Id. at 726, quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 697 (1972).
88. Id. at 726-27.
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news gathering activities."" Hidden recording devices are not
"indispensable" tools of news gathering, the court said."o In-
vestigative reporting was conducted successfully long before
the development of tape recorders."
Although some state courts show a disposition to uphold or
even create limitations on consensual monitoring, other courts
have stretched or ignored the language of state statutes requir-
ing all-party consent to tape recordings by private individuals.
The Georgia Supreme Court ruled that a statute making it un-
lawful "to intentionally overhear, transmit, or record . . . the
private conversation of another . ." does not prohibit partici-
pant monitoring. Overturning a lower court decision and
overriding the objections of two dissenters, the Georgia
Supreme Court held that overhearing, transmitting and record-
ing discussions were prohibited only when all three occurred
in a single offense. But how, the court asked, could a partici-
pant to a conversation "overhear" himself? Because he
couldn't, the court concluded that the law must not have been
intended to prohibit participant recording.9 3
In a bizarre case in Washington, the state Supreme Court
ruled that the sounds of shooting recorded by a man who was
gunned down in an alley did not constitute a "private conversa-
tion."94 The tape removed from the body of the victim was thus
admissible as evidence despite a Washington statute requiring
all-party consent to the recording of private conversations. 95
Under the same statute, a man trying to extort $10,000 from
Spokane police was held not to be engaging in a private conver-
sation when he made his demands to police over the tele-
89. Id. at 727.
90. Id.
91. Id. See also Case Comment, Constitutional Law: Newsgathering: Reporters
Have No Right to Use Hidden Recording Devices, 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 652 (1978).
92. State v. Birge, 240 Ga. 501, 502, 241 S.E.2d 213, 214 (1978), citing GA. CODE ANN.
§ 26-3001(a) (1972).
93. 240 Ga. at 502, 241 S.E.2d at 214. The dissenters argued that the word "over-
hear" should not control the interpretation of the whole statute. While a participant to
a conversation cannot "overhear" himself, he can "record" or "transmit" a conversa-
tion. The dissenters argued that the Georgia statute prohibited the recording, the
transmission or the overhearing of a conversation, absent consent of all parties. Id. at
502-03, 241 S.E.2d at 214.
94. State v. Smith, 85 Wash. 2d 840, 846, 540 P.2d 424, 428 (1975). "Gunfire, running,
shouting, and [the victim's] screams do not constitute 'conversation' within the term's
ordinary connotation of oral exchange, discourse, or discussion." Id. at 846, 540 P.2d at
428.
95. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.73.030 (Supp. 1979).
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phone. The extortionist "intended to direct his extortion
demand to the City of Spokane," not just to the law enforce-
ment officers who recorded his call, the court reasoned." The
California statute prohibiting the tapping of phone conversa-
tions and the recording of all confidential conversations with-
out consent of all parties has also been interpreted as not
prohibiting participant recording of telephone conversations.9 7
Not only have some all-party-consent statutes been relaxed
through judicial interpretation, several all-party statutes have
major exceptions which leave room for consensual recording
by reporters and other private citizens. One of the broadest
exceptions is section 633.5 of the California Penal Code which
permits one party to a confidential communication to record
the other party without notification to obtain evidence "reason-
ably believed to relate to the commission by another party to
such communication of the crime of extortion, kidnapping,
bribery, any felony involving violence against the person, or a
violation of section 653m," which prohibits annoying telephone
calls." Under section 633.5, a councilman threatened with a
bribe could record a telephone conversation that would help to
96. State v. Forrester, 21 Wash. App. 855, 587 P.2d 179, 184 (1978).
97. Rogers v. Ulrich, 52 Cal. App. 3d 894, 125 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1975).
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled admissible a tape-recorded tele-
phone conversation between a kidnapper and his brother, despite an all-party-consent
requirement. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 349 N.E.2d 337 (Mass. 1976). The court rea-
soned the kidnapper showed "actual knowledge" of the recording when he said, "You
know, I know the phone is tapped, I'm hep to that." Id. at 339. The court ruled the
recording was not a prohibited "interception" even though the kidnapper's brother had
never specifically told him that his conversation was being recorded. There was no
provision in the statute saying that "actual knowledge" of a recording, in this case ap-
parently based on surmise, constituted consent.
The Delaware federal district court ruled that the state legislature, when creating
statutory language making it a violation of privacy to intercept telephone or private
conversations without the consent of all parties "except as authorized by law," was
attempting to emulate federal laws which do not prohibit recording of telephone con-
versations when only one party has given consent. Thus, a building contractor being
extorted could tape conversations on his own phone. United States v. Vespe, 389 F.
Supp. 1359 (D. Del. 1975).
The California Supreme Court even sanctioned a motel manager's monitoring as a
third party of the phone calls to a room where she suspected tenants were engaged in
prostitution or selling narcotics. People v. Soles, 68 Cal. App. 3d 418, 136 Cal. Rptr. 328
(1977). The court held that the conversations were not confidential. Had the manager
not listened in to confirm her suspicions and subsequently sought police help, her
awareness might have ripened into guilty knowledge, subjecting her to possible penal-
ties. The manager had a lawful right and duty to guard against misuse of her property;
that right and duty precluded the tenants from entertaining a reasonable expectation
of privacy. Id. at 421, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
98. CAL. PENAL CODE § 633.5 (1970).
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establish the guilt of the offering party while simultaneously
corroborating the councilman's claims of innocence.9 9 A wo-
man raped by her psychiatrist could use a tape recorder to
gather information against her attacker.100 If a reporter wished
to stay within the California statute, he could record face-to-
face conversations in which he expected to uncover violence or
official corruption, but not conversations where he might un-
cover crimes against the consumer, such as fraudulent land of-
fers, or illegal drug sales, prostitution and other vice unless
extortion, kidnapping, bribery or violence were also suspected.
The Washington all-party-consent statute contains excep-
tions that would permit a wider range of consensual recording
than in California. Like the California statute, the Washington
statute permits a citizen to secretly record "wire communica-
tions or conversations" which convey threats of extortion,
blackmail or bodily harm, but in Washington, unlike California,
a person can also record conversations which contain "other
unlawful requests or demands."' Thus, under the Washing-
ton statute a reporter would be free to use a secret recorder to
99. People v. Montgomery, 61 Cal. App. 3d 718, 132 Cal. Rptr. 558 (1976). The in-
criminating telephone conversations in this case were actually recorded by police who,
under section 633, are permitted to engage in participant monitoring. But the court
noted that the councilman might have recorded the conversations himself under sec-
tion 633.5. Id. at 731-32, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 567. See also People v. Strohl, 57 Cal. App. 3d
347, 129 Cal. Rptr. 224 (1976). People wishing to engage in participant monitoring of
telephone conversations in California may not need the statutory exemption since at
least one court has held that the all-party-consent requirement permits consensual
telehpone monitoring. See Rogers v. Ulrich, 52 Cal. App. 3d 894, 125 Cal. Rptr. 306
(1975). But, even if the statute does not permit participant monitoring or telehpone
conversations outside of the statutory exemptions, evidence illegally gained by private
individuals (such as reporters) may be admissible in court. See People v. Ayers, 51
Cal. App. 3d 370, 376, 124 Cal. Rptr. 283, 287-88 (1975). Whatever the range of "legal"
participant telephone recording under the California statute, FCC regulations and tel-
ephone company tariffs impose other considerations. See notes 132-57, infra, and ac-
companying text.
100. People v. Wojahan, 169 Cal. App. 2d 135, 337 P.2d 192 (1959). The recording was
carried out with police participation before section 633.5 was added to the California
statute. However, presumably a psychiatrist's patient or a reporter could make his or
her own recording under the provision in section 633.5 which permits participant moni-
toring to document "any felony involving violence against the person."
101. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.73.030(2) (Supp. 1979). The Georgia all-party-con-
sent statute also has a very wide exception, permitting participant recording where
"the message shall constitute the commission of a crime or is directly in the further-
ance of a crime." GA. CODE ANN. § 26-3006 (1978). For exceptions to federal prohibi-
tions on participant telephone recording see notes 143-50, infra, and accompanying
text.
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pursue information about fraudulent commercial offers and
vice, despite the all-party-consent requirement.
C. Consensual Recording as a Tort
Not only may consensual monitoring be prohibited by stat-
ute, but it can be actionable as a tortious invasion of privacy.
There are many cases where secret placement of a bug in a
room, often by a landlord, has been held to be an actionable
tort,102 but there are few cases where a court has examined to
what extent consensual recording might be a separate tort.
The only reported case where consensual monitoring by the
press was treated as a tort is Dietemann v. Time, Inc. ,103 a case
in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a re-
porter and photographer violated the privacy of a "quack" doc-
tor in California when they surreptitiously photographed and
transmitted a conversation in the den of the "doctor's" home.
The photographer and reporter for Life magazine gained en-
trance to Dietemann's home by falsely claiming to have been
referred by one of Dietemann's friends. Once inside, the re-
porter, a Mrs. Metcalf, and her companion, were taken to
Dietemann's den. There, Mrs. Metcalf told the doctor she had
a lump in her breast. Dietemann said the lump was caused by
her having eaten rancid butter 11 years, 9 months and 7 days
previously. While the doctor talked and waved what appeared
to be a wand over the diseased tissue, Mrs. Metcalf's compan-
ion surreptitiously took photographs. In the meantime, the
conversation was secretly transmitted to a car outside where
other Life employees were recording it along with an official
from the District Attorney's office and the State Department of
Public Health. In a later article in Life, a picture was published
showing Dietemann's hand on the upper part of Mrs. Metcalf's
breast. The recorded conversation was referred to, but was not
quoted. Dietemann was arrested for practicing medicine with-
out a license. However, in a privacy suit against Time, Inc., the
publisher of Life magazine, Dietemann won $1,000 in damages.
Writing for the Ninth Circuit, Judge Shirley Hufstedler noted
that evidence of trespass and the publication of the informa-
tion gained surreptitiously were not necessary to an actionable
tort. Nor was the court particularly bothered by the subterfuge
102. E.g., Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964); Roach v. Harper,
143 W. Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d 564 (1958).
103. 284 F. Supp. 925 (C.D. Cal. 1968), afd, 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
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used by Mrs. Metcalf and her fellow reporter to gain entry to
Dietemann's house. Sounding much like the Supreme Court
in its Fourth Amendment consensual monitoring cases, Judge
Hufstedler wrote that "[ol ne who invites another to his home
or office takes a risk that the visitor may not be what he seems,
and that the visitor may repeat all that he hears and observes
when he leaves.""o' But, Judge Hufstedler said,
[tihe First Amendment is not a license to trespass, to steal, or
to intrude by electronic means into the precincts of another's
home or office. It does not become such a license simply be-
cause the person subjected to the intrusion is reasonably sus-
pected of committing a crime. 05
Exactly what constitutes the electronic intrusion in the
Dietemann case is not clearly spelled out. Apparently Judge
Hufstedler considers participant monitoring as practiced by
the Life employees to be as reprehensible as the most intru-
sive bugging by third parties. Unlike the United States
Supreme Court, Judge Hufstedler did not distinguish between
third-party bugging and participant monitoring. The cases
cited by the Ninth Circuit as demonstrating that mere intro-
duction of electronic eavesdropping devices into the privacy of
one's home could be tortious are all third-party monitoring
cases of the most offensive kind. Two of the cited cases in-
volved landlords placing bugs in tenants' apartments, includ-
ing one in a marital bedroom.'06 In another case cited by Judge
Hufstedler, the Coca Cola Company bugged the hospital room
of a person suing the company. 0 7 Another case involved wire-
tapping Ralph Nader's telephone.' Judge Hufstedler did not
104. Id. at 249. See notes 67-71, supra, and accompanying text. The subterfuge used
to gain entry was of much more concern to the trial court: "If a person's home, or even
his business premises, is to be subjected to invasion by subterfuge for the purpose of
obtaining facts concerning his private life, then privacy would not exist." 284 F. Supp.
925, 929-30.
105. 449 F.2d 245, 249. Judge Hufstedler has made no secret of her opposition to the
Supreme Court's support of participant monitoring. See her dissenting opinion in
Holmes v. Burr, 486 F.2d 55, 72 (9th Cir. 1973). See also Hufstedler, The Directions and
Misdirections of a Constitutional Right of Privacy, 26 REC. N.Y.C.B.A. 546, 555-57
(1971).
106. See cases cited at note 102, supra.
107. McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E.2d 810 (1939).
108. Nader v. General Motors, 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1970).
Although the New York Court of Appeals did not approve wiretapping, the court saw
no invasion of privacy if General Motors interviewed Nader's friends in an attempt to
get confidential information or procured women in an attempt to entice Nader into an
indiscretion. Id. at 569, 255 N.E.2d at 770, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 654. Judge Hufstedler also
cited Pearson v. Dodd in which the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that it
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distinguish, either, between recording a conversation and
transmitting the voice to an outside party for recording, a dis-
tinction made by Mr. Justice Harlan in the White case. 109 Nor
did Judge Hufstedler's opinion distinguish cameras and elec-
tronic devices.o10
The court in Dietemann also ignored precedent in Fourth
Amendment cases on the nature of private places. The court
noted with approval and affirmed the trial court's findings that
Dietemann's den was an area in which he could expect privacy
because it was his home; he was not a "medical man"; he did
not advertise; he had no phone; he locked his gate; and he did
not charge for his "services.""' But to some members of the
Supreme Court, Dietemann's offering of a "professional" serv-
ice in his home might significantly diminish the doctor's claim
to privacy. In Lewis v. United States, where it was held that a
federal agent did not violate the Fourth Amendment when he
entered a person's private property after being invited to make
an illegal drug purchase, the Supreme Court said that where a
home is converted into a
commercial center in which outsiders are invited for purposes
of transacting unlawful business, that business is entitled to no
greater sanctity than if it were carried on in a store, a garage, a
car, or on the street. A government agent, in the same manner
as a private person, may enter upon the premises for the very
purposes contemplated by the occupant."12
Besides minimizing what to some jurists might be the rather
public nature of Dietemann's den, the Ninth Circuit made little
of the Life reporters' unusually close working relationship with
the police, a relationship which virtually made the two Life em-
ployees police informants working under color of law." 3 The
Ninth Circuit accepted Life's disclaimer that the two journal-
was not an intrusion tort for a journalist to publish documents stolen by others from a
senator's office, although the court "assumed" the senator's employees committed an
intrusion by stealing the documents. 410 F.2d 701, 704-05 (1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
947 (1969).
109. See note 82, supra.
110. See Cantrell v. Forest City Publ. Co., 419 U.S. 245, 253 n.5 (1974) (photographer
who took accurate pictures did not contribute to the false light in which a newspaper
writer cast a family following a tragedy).
111. 449 F.2d 245, 247 (9th Cir. 1971).
112. 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966). The rear of On Lee's laundry had living quarters, but in
the view of the Supreme Court, that did not make the rooms in the front where busi-
ness was transacted private. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 749, 751-52 (1952).
See text accompanying notes 67-68, supra.
113. An informant has been held to have worked under color of law when he acted
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ists were not acting under color of law, thus enabling the court
to avoid Fourth Amendment issues.11 4 Yet the reporters were
acting under the direction of government investigators to as
large a degree as the police informants in the Supreme Court's
participant monitoring cases.15 Not only were there law en-
forcement officers in the car listening to the transmission from
Dietemann's home, but Mrs. Metcalf and her colleague had a
prior agreement with law enforcement officers that evidence
gained through surrpetitious monitoring could be used in
court." 6 Judge Carter, in his concurring opinion, thought the
court should decide the Life reporters' liability as agents of the
police, even if the Fourth Amendment was not violated." 7 It is
easy to understand why the Life reporters might have been
embarrassed; their rather formal working relationship with the
police violates what many reporters would consider standards
of ethical reporting. Yet, despite the questionable journalistic
ethics, the Life employees' close cooperation with police
should strengthen the legality of their surreptitious monitor-
ing. Police informants of much lower reputation, working
under no closer police supervision, could have conducted simi-
lar participant monitoring in Dietemann's den without violat-
ing the California eavesdropping statute,"s the Omnibus
Crime Control Act" 9 or the Supreme Court's participant moni-
toring cases.12 0 Electronic eavesdropping may be an independ-
ent tort, but it is difficult to weigh the importance of the unique
Dietemann case as precedent where the court's opinion ig-
nores so many contrary opinions on the nature of electronic
intrusion, the expectation of privacy in a place of business and
the legality of participant monitoring under police supervision.
at the direction of government investigators. United States v. Rich, 518 F.2d 980, 985
(1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 907 (1976).
114. 449 F.2d 245, 247 (9th Cir. 1971).
115. E.g., in On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952), the informant transmitted
directly to a narcotics agent. In Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966), two fed-
eral district judges authorized FBI agents to conceal a recorder on an informant. This
"antecedent justification before a magistrate" was of particular importance to Mr. Jus-
tice Stewart in his opinion for the court in Osborn. See note 75, supra.
116. 449 F.2d 245, 246 (9th Cir. 1971).
117. Id. at 252 (Carter, J., concurring and dissenting).
118. See notes 99-100, supra. The California statute permits participant monitoring
by police and permits participant monitoring by anyone where evidence is being gath-
ered of "any felony involving violence against the person." CAL. PENAL CODE § 633.5
(1971).
119. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2) (d) (1976).
120. See notes 67-75, supra, and accompanying text.
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D. Consensual Monitoring and the FCC
1. Radio Transmitters
If a consensual monitor uses either a radio device or a tele-
phone, as opposed to a tape recorder alone, he must take into
consideration not only federal and state laws, but also FCC
regulations. The Federal Communications Commission in its
1966 eavesdropping rules prohibited consensual monitoring
with a radio device, but little heed apparently is paid to the
rule because of its light penalties and its questionable legal
status.
When the FCC issued its notice of proposed rulemaking on
eavesdropping in 1964, the Commission intended to follow the
Supreme Court's assumption that "anyone who engages in
conversation with others must assume the risk that anything
he says may be divulged without his knowledge by any other
party to the conversation.""' However, between the time of
the rulemaking notice and the final Report and Order, the
Commission changed its mind, concluding that the right of pri-
vacy in communications is too important to permit any rule ex-
cept an all-party-consent requirement. "The right of privacy is
precious, and should not be sacrificed to the eavesdropper's
needs without compelling reason," the FCC said:
We cannot find such reason here, subject to the single excep-
tion . . . for law enforcement officers operating under lawful
authority. We agree that the ordinary risk of being overheard
is converted into another risk entirely when the electronic de-
vice is made the instrument of the intruder. Coupled to a re-
cording device, this new eavesdropping tool puts upon the
speaker a risk he has not deliberately assumed, and goes far
toward making private conversation impossible. We do not be-
lieve the assumption of such a risk should be made the basis of
our rules. . . . Upon reflection, we do not believe it to be con-
sistent with the public interest to permit this new product of
man's ingenuity to destroy our traditional right to privacy. 122
Apparently believing that a person should be able to trust the
person to whom he is speaking, the FCC issued rules prohibit-
ing anyone from "either directly or indirectly" using a device
"required to be licensed by section 301" of the FCC Act for
overhearing or recording "the private conversations of the
121. Use of Radio Devices for Eavesdropping, 2 F.C.C.2d 641, 643, 6 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P&F) 1691, 1694 (1966).
122. Id. at 643-44, 6 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) at 1694.
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other unless such use is authorized by all parties engaging in
the conversation." 12 3
CBS and the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
opposed this all-party-consent rule, fearing it would hamper
surreptitious use of radio devices for recording in public and
semi-public places where such monitoring might benefit the
public.12 4 CBS feared it could no longer produce television
shows like "Biography of a Bookie Joint" under the new rule.
The FCC attempted to allay the network's fears by excluding
from the all-party requirement the transmission of conversa-
tions overheard in public and semi-public places.125 But this
exception goes no further than the already well-established
principle that one can record what he can easily overhear.126
Being able to record what one can overhear would be of little
value in producing shows like "Biography of a Bookie Joint" if
a reporter could not also record conversations in which he par-
ticipated. If a reporter carried a transmitter into a bookie joint
and struck up a conversation, he would immediately violate
the all-party-consent requirement if he simultaneously trans-
mitted the conversation to a recorder elsewhere. The FCC, by
permitting the transmission of an overheard conversation, but
not of a conversation in which the monitor is a party, is more
restrictive than the Omnibus Crime Control Act and the law of
the majority of the states.12 7
As a practical matter, broadcasters have quite safely ignored
FCC prohibitions on the use of transmitters in investigative
stories on such topics as bookie joints, pederasty, prostitution,
drug sales and other stories that can be filmed in public
123. 47 C.F.R. §§ 2.701, 15.11 (1978). See note 62, supra.
124. Use of Radio Devices for Eavesdropping, 2 F.C.C.2d at 645, 6 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F)
at 1695.
125. See notes 62-64, supra, and accompanying text.
126. See notes 53-56, supra, and accompanying text.
127. Of course the journalist can avoid running afoul of FCC eavesdropping regula-
tions by using a tape recorder instead of a transmitter, although this might make it
more difficult for a broadcaster to synchronize words with video if a distance camera is
also used.
Apparently CBS was satisfied that the FCC's exceptions to its eavesdropping rules
did not interfere with participant monitoring in investigative reporting. CBS Produc-
tion Standards, supra note 9, state:
V. Recording Or Overhearing Oral Conversations With Radio Devices (Directly or
Indirectly):
"a) ... under Federal law, where a CBS employee is a party to a conversation, in a
public or semi-public place, the consent of the other party is not required." This au-
thor found no other written authority or legal counsel that agreed that FCC regulations
permit participant monitoring with a radio device.
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places.'2 8 The FCC's eavesdropping rules are little known and
have never been challenged or interpreted either by the FCC
or by the courts. Until recently, the penalties have been either
too large or too small to give broadcast licensees much to fear.
The FCC's ultimate threat-loss of license '2 -is too draconian
a measure to pose much of a threat from an administrative
agency which seldom uses its most potent power. Small fines
and forfeitures also have little coercive power, although maxi-
mum penalties have recently been increased.' Publishers
who do not hold broadcast licenses and who have therefore not
been subject to FCC forfeitures are now subject to a $5,000 for-
feiture for illegal use of a transmitter.131
2. Telephones
An area of special concern to the reporter is the use of tape
recorders for telephone conversations. Surely no consensual
monitoring is practiced as routinely as recording telephone
conversations. 3 2 With a tape recorder attached to a telephone,
a reporter can retain accurate records of threats and fraudu-
lent offers as well as telephone numbers, names, addresses
and news tips. Just as FCC regulations on consensual moni-
128. For example, on Oct. 23, 1977, CBS broadcast a segment of "60 Minutes" dealing
with the illegal sale of PCP or "angel dust." Two undercover agents of the Santa Clara
County California Narcotics Bureau were wired to record sound. Although CBS was
doing the filming and recording, it might be argued the participant monitoring was
being conducted by law enforcement officers and thus was not prohibited by the FCC.
FCC rules permit participant recording by authorized law enforcement officers. 47
C.F.R. § 15.11(b) (1978). On Dec. 15, 1977, Channel 13 in Houston ran a documentary,
"Boys For Sale," which used boys equipped with transmitters to record sexual pro-
positions by grown men, some of them prominent in the community.
129. The FCC's power to revoke licenses is derived from 47 U.S.C. § 312 (1976).
130. Under section 605 of the Federal Communications Act a licensee is subject to a
fine of $500 a day for each day that a section of the act or a rule of the commission is
violated. Id. at § 502. An amendment to the Act in 1978 increased forfeitures for broad-
casters from $1,000 to $2,000 a day, up to a total of $20,000. P.L.95-234, 92 Stat. 33 (codi-
fied at 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2) (Supp. III 1979)).
131. In 1978, Congress extended jurisdiction over which the FCC might impose a
forfeiture from "any licensee or permittee of a broadcast station," 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1)
(1976), to "[any person" who violates the Federal Communictions Act or Rules, 47
U.S.C. § 503(b) (Supp. III 1979), 47 C.F.R. § 1.80 (1979). Non-broadcasters are subject to
a forfeiture of up to $5,000. Id. at § 503(b) (2) (B). The legislative history states that the
new amendment extends to "users of part 15" radio devices, which would include a
reporter using a low-power transmitter. See note 62, supra. S. REP. No. 95-580, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1978).
132. Prohibitions against participant telephone monitoring are probably violated
"tens of thousands of times a day in L[os] Alngeles] alone." Seymour, Recording
Telephone Conversations: The Problem of Participant Monitoring, 8 J. BEVERLY HiLs
B.A. 47 (MAY-JUNE 1974).
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toring with radio devices are more prohibitive than federal law
and the law in most states, FCC regulations governing the tap-
ing of telephone conversations are also more restrictive than
federal and state law. However, because many of the FCC's
prohibitions on participant telephone recording are incorpo-
rated in telephone company tariff regulations, they are even
less potent than FCC regulations on transmitters.
The courts interpreted section 605 of the Federal Communi-
cations Act of 1934 to permit participant monitoring and re-
cording of telephone conversations.13 3 The courts interpreted
"sender" in section 605-"no person not being authorized by
the sender shall intercept any communication"-to mean not
just the originator of a call, but also the receiver. 13 4 "Every tel-
ephone talk," Judge Learned Hand said,
like any other talk, is antiphonal; each party is alternatively
sender and receiver and it would deny all significance to the
privilege created by § 605 to hold that because one party
originated the call he had power to surrender the other's privi-
lege.135
A party to a call does not "intercept" it when he records it, and
thus does not "divulge" it in violation of section 605 when he
passes the contents along to someone else, such as a newspa-
per reporter.13 6 Chapter 119 of the Omnibus Crime Control
Act, which preempts section 605 with respect to wire communi-
cations, explicitly permits participant telephone recording. 3 7
Although federal courts and federal statute permit unan-
nounced recording of telephone conversations, the Federal
Communications Commission since 1948 has, in effect, had an
all-party-consent requirement. The FCC, which was "keenly
appreciative of the importance and desirability of privacy in
telephone conversations,"3 s mandated that telephone com-
pany tariffs require an electronic beep tone in all recorded tele-
phone messages.139  A telephone subscriber was thereby
133. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 87 F. Supp. 970 (D.D.C. 1950), rev'd on other
grounds, 184 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
134. See, e.g., United States v. Stephenson, 121 F. Supp. 274 (D.D.C. 1954), appeal
dismissed, 223 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
135. United States v. Polakoff, 112 F.2d 888, 889 (2d Cir. 1940).
136. Smith v. Cincinnati Post & Times Star, 353 F. Supp. 1126, 1127 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
137. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1976).
138. Request for Elimination of the "Beep Tone," 58 F.C.C.2d 6 (1976). The request
was denied.
139. Use of Recording Devices in Connection with Telephone Service, 11 F.C.C. 1033
(1947); 12 F.C.C. 1005 (1947). By the time of the order, the Bell System companies had
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placed under an obligation to the telephone company, not to
the FCC, to announce recorded telephone conversations with a
beep tone.
In 1970, broadcast licensees were given an additional obliga-
tion for which they are responsible to the FCC. The FCC di-
rected that all broadcast licensees give advance warning if a
telephone conversation was being recorded for broadcast.4 0
Because advance warning was considered sufficient protection
of a caller, the FCC in 1972 removed the beep tone requirement
for telephone conversations recorded for broadcast where ad-
vance warning was actually given.14' A rule pending before the
FCC's Common Carrier Division would do away with the beep
tone requirement entirely, provided that advance oral notifica-
tion was given that a telephone conversation was being re-
corded, whether the conversation was for broadcast or not.'4 2
Several exceptions to the beep tone requirement have been
established. Under telephone company tariffs, no notice need
be given where the Secret Service needs to make secret re-
cordings to protect the President and his family or where the
Department of Defense Command Centers need to make unan-
nounced recordings.' Under the proposed rule pending
before the FCC, these exceptions would be continued and a
new exception would be made for incoming calls to well-publi-
cized emergency numbers.'44
Of more importance to reporters, the pending rules would
continue an exemption to the notice requirement created by
made two installations of telephone recorders, both for newspapers, the first being in
1936. 11 F.C.C. 1033, 1039 (1947).
140. Broadcast of Telephone Conversations, 23 F.C.C.2d 1, 19 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F)
1504 (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.1206 (1978)).
141. Use of Recording Devices in Connection with Telephone Service, 38 F.C.C.2d
579, 26 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 40 (1972).
142. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking- Use of Recording Devices in Connection with
Telephone Service, Docket No. 20840, 67 F.C.C.2d 1392, 1402 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking]. NBC filed comments with the commission request-
ing that broadcasters be required to get consent before broadcast of a recorded con-
versation, not before the recording is made. The network argues that the advance-
consent requirement inhibits investigative journalism and diminishes the spontaneity
of conversations. Id. at 1400.
A Petition for Rulemaking, RM-2564, filed with the Commission in 1975 requests that
the FCC amend Rule 73.1206 and require advance consent for all conversations taped
for broadcast, not just telephone conversations. June 20, 1975.
143. FCC Tariff No. 263, Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. 2.6.4(D)(3), effective July 28, 1976.
144. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 67 F.C.C.2d at 1400-01.
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the FCC in 1973 in Maller v. New England Telephone Co.'4 5 In
Maller, the Commission ruled that a telephone subscriber did
not have to provide a beep tone where calls violated telephone
company tariffs or section 223 of the Federal Communications
Act, which prohibit abusive or fraudulent calls. 4 ' "[Wie be-
lieve," the Commission said, "that any person who makes a call
that is clearly prohibited by the tariffs or by some statutory
provision such as section 223 of the Act, should be considered
as waiving any rights he may have under the tariffs to receive
the 'beep tone' warning of the recordation of any such prohib-
ited call.'17 The FCC concluded that Maller could record with-
out warning the repeated harassing calls he received in the
middle of the night from a collection agency. Such unan-
nounced recording, the Commission said, "is desirable to iden-
tification or tracing or proof of content of the message ...
where the transmission of the 'beep tone' would effectively
thwart any such efforts.""4 s Rules pending before the FCC
would exempt from notification requirements any calls for an
"unlawful purpose,""' making explicit what is probably al-
ready an exemption to the beep tone requirement because tel-
ephone company tariffs prohibit the use of a telephone for an
unlawful purpose. 5 o The FCC, then, like several states,1' pro-
hibits unannounced telephone recording generally, but pro-
145. 44 F.C.C.2d 614, 29 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 125 (1973).
146. Id. at 623, 29 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) at 135.
Tariff No. 263, supra note 143, forbids the use of the telephone "for a call or calls,
anonymous or otherwise, if in a manner reasonably expected to frighten, abuse, tor-
ment or harass another;" or calls for an "unlawful purpose." §§ 2.2.2, 2.2.3, 2.4.3.
Section 223 of the Federal Communications Act provides for a fine of up to $500 and
up to six months in jail for using a phone to make a call which is "obscene, lewd, lasciv-
ious, filthy, or indecent," or "with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass"' 47
U.S.C. § 223 (1976).
147. Mailer v. New England Tel. Co., 44 F.C.C.2d 614, 623, 29 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 125,
135 (1973). It is difficult to square this rule, where a caller automatically relinquishes a
right to be warned of a recording by making an abusive or illegal call, with the FCC's
prohibition of in-person participant monitoring with a transmitter where the conversa-
tion might be just as abusive or the transaction as illegal. See notes 121-31, supra, and
accompanying text.
148. Id.
149. "Whenever a call is made for an unlawful purpose, such as a bomb threat, ob-
scene call or kidnap ransom demand, the public interest requires that the originator of
such a call be considered to have waived his right to be notified of any recording by the
receiving party. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 142, at 1400.
150. See note 146, supra.
151. See notes 98-101, supra, and accompanying text.
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vides exceptions which leave reporters considerable freedom
for investigative reporting within the law.
Broadcasters have considerably more respect for the FCC
rules aimed directly at them which require advance warnings
or beep tones for telephone conversations taped for broadcast
than they do for the telephone company tariffs which require a
beep tone in all recorded telephone conversations. CBS broad-
cast a recording that was taped in violation of telephone com-
pany tariffs, 5 2 but in the broadcast, the network pointed out
that the recording was made before it was known that it would
be used in a broadcast. The network thus told the FCC on the
air that the Commission's notice requirements for conversa-
tions taped for broadcast had not been violated. NBC has re-
corded telephone conversations without a beep tone in
violation of telephone company tariffs, but has avoided direct
liability with the FCC by not broadcasting the tape.15 3 Instead,
the network did what stations often do; it placed verbatim tran-
scripts of key passages from the tape on the screen while the
passages were read by a reporter.
It is not difficult to see why broadcasters and newspaper re-
porters, as well as lawyers, businessmen and private investiga-
tors, ignore telephone company tariffs prohibiting telephone
tape recordings without a beep tone. It is the telephone com-
pany's responsibility, under penalty of a small fine, to see that
its customers are not engaged in illegal tape recording. If the
company finds a violator of its tariffs, the company can remove
the subscriber's phone.15 4 Such a penalty might be effective
against a single subscriber, but it would serve little purpose if
imposed against a bookmaking operation or a corporate sub-
scriber which could simply renew telephone service under an-
other name in a different location. '5 5 In any event, a telephone
company which hopes to get favorable media coverage for its
periodic requests for rate increases has little incentive to
152. "60 Minutes," April 15, 1969.
153. "NBC Nightly News," March 9, 17, 1977. The reporter recorded part of a tele-
phone call from a man offering land for sale in Florida. It could be argued that this call,
received in Texas, was not a violation of telephone company tariffs because the call
was for an illegal purpose, a fraudulent land offer.
154. FCC Tariff No. 263, Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., § 2.6.7, effective July 28, 1976.
155. See R. Greenawalt, The Consent Problem in Wiretapping & Eavesdropping:
Surreptitious Monitoring with the Consent of a Participant in a Conversation, 68
COLUM. L. REV. 189, 206-07 (1968).
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search out or punish news media which record telephone con-
versations in violation of company tariffs.
Further undermining the coercive power of telephone com-
pany tariffs is the questionable legal authority of the tariffs
themselves. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to
exclude evidence of criminality obtained by a recording in the
absence of a beep tone, saying, "a regulation or order directed
to the carrier over whom the Federal Communications Com-
mission has jurisdiction . . . cannot be viewed as creating a
new crime prohibited to the citizenry nor as changing the rules
of evidence evolved in the federal courts."15 6
If pending FCC rules replacing beep tones with advance-
warning requirements are adopted, evasion of the rule might
be less frequent than evasion of telephone company tariffs.
The new rule would be incorporated into the Federal Commu-
nications Commission's own regulations, thus allowing the
Commission to move directly against a subscriber with a $500
fine for each day of the violation.'
Summary
Reporters may record or transmit conversations they over-
hear, they participate in, or they record with permission of one
party, unless the reporters are operating in one of thirteen
states that prohibit consensual monitoring. A reporter must
also take into consideration the Dietemann case which sug-
gests that using electronic monitoring equipment in a private
place may be a tortious invasion of privacy. In those states re-
quiring consent by all parties to a conversation for a recording,
the statute may contain exceptions for recording annoying or
illegal calls without notice.
FCC regulations prohibit the use of a transmitter for partici-
pant monitoring, but the rules are seldom enforced. Telephone
company tariffs and FCC regulations applying to broadcasters
require either advance notice or a beep tone if telephone con-
versations are taped. However, the tariffs do not apply to abu-
sive or harassing calls and may not apply to illegal calls
generally.
156. Ferguson v. United States, 307 F.2d 787, 790 (10th Cir. 1962) (citations omitted).
See also Harris v. United States, 310 F.2d 934 (10th Cir. 1962); United States v. Alexan-
der, 218 F. Supp. 916 (W.D. Pa. 1963).
157. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 142, at 1403.
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III
The Press, Participant Monitoring and Privacy
Thus far, this article has attempted to define the law regulat-
ing the surreptitious use of tape recorders and to discuss some
of the implications of the law for journalists. No attempt has
been made to suggest the extent to which the surreptitious use
of tape recorders by journalists or other private citizens ought
to be allowed. This final section, taking a more normative ap-
proach, will argue that participant monitoring should be al-
lowed of anyone engaged in "public business." Public
business includes the work-related activities, whether legal or
illegal, of public officials, public figures, businessmen and pro-
fessionals. Anyone who offers a product or service to another
or exercises a public responsibility carries out public business.
Of course officials, businessmen and professionals do not
conduct public business all the time. A public figure, like any
citizen, is entitled to private times when there is no likelihood
that what is said will later be reproduced on tape. This last
section, then, is an attempt to distinguish between public busi-
ness, where consensual monitoring by any participant does not
invade privacy, and truly private conversations where secret
monitoring is an invasion of privacy.
As more and more states pass statutes prohibiting consen-
sual monitoring, it may become increasingly important for me-
dia representatives to argue in opposition that such
prohibitions on surreptitious taping curtail investigative re-
porting without protecting legitimate privacy interests. Oppos-
ing all-party-consent statutes on the grounds of an overriding
public "right to know" is likely to be ineffective because the
Supreme Court has never firmly endorsed a constitutionally
based right to know.15 8 In any event, it could be difficult con-
vincing a court or legislature that even a constitutionally based
right to receive information should override a prohibition on
participant monitoring if that prohibition protects, as it some-
times does, the privacy rights of those who engage in conversa-
tion. Whether based on the Constitution or the common law, a
right of privacy should not be easily subordinated to other
158. See Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753
(1972); Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGs L.J. 631 (1975). See also Shevin v. Sun-
beam Television Corp., 351 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1977). See notes 85-91, supra, and accompa-
nying text.
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rights."'9 Thus, the press may be left with the argument that
all-party-consent laws ought not to apply where public busi-
ness is being conducted, not because of a superior First
Amendment "right to know," but because there is no invasion
of privacy where public business is secretly recorded by a par-
ticipant. The primary difference between public and private
business is the role played by the participants.
A. Public versus Private Roles
Privacy has been defined in many ways. In constitutional
analysis, privacy is the right to make choices about intimate
family matters6 o and to be accurately represented in the me-
dia.'6 ' Tort law protects the right of an individual to be free
from commercial exploitation,'6 2 from intrusion into private
placesl 63 and from the revelation of intimate details.16 4 Privacy
has been called the right to be let alone' and the right to con-
trol information about onself.16 6
While all of these interests may be at stake in one circum-
stance or another, at its base, privacy law protects what Emer-
159. When one is talking about fundamental rights, as opposed to mere privileges or
conveniences, one is talking about endowments that should be infringed only in an
emergency. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGrrs SERIOUSLY 184-205 (1977). Certainly to
the extent an individual has a "right" of privacy or personality, infringement cannot be
justified on the grounds of a reporter's need to use a tape recorder for speed or accu-
racy of reporting. See note 1, supra, and accompanying text.
160. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticutt, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
161. E.g., Cantrell v. Forest City Publ. Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
162. E.g., Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
163. E.g., Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964); Roach v. Harper,
143 W. Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d 564 (1958).
164. E.g., Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942). These categories
are set forth in Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
165. This was part of the definition of privacy adopted by Brandeis in his Olmstead
dissent. See note 20, supra. See also Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv.
L. REV. 193 (1890). "The right to one's person may be said to be a right of complete
immunity: to be let alone." T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS, at 29 (2d ed.
1888).
166. This definition was popularized after its eloquent expression in A. WESTIN, PRI-
VACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). Informational privacy is of particular relevance as com-
puterized data banks gather increasingly large amounts of intimate information about
citizens and as technological developments permit ever more intrusive forms of elec-
tronic surveillance. For a perceptive discussion of the law of informational privacy, see
R. GREENAWALT, LEGAL PROTECTIONS OF PRIVACY, REPORT TO THE OFFICE OF TELECOM-
MUNICATIONS POLICY (1975). See also Metelski, Achieving Communications Privacy
Through Revision of the Eavesdropping Laws, 30 FED. COM. B.J. 135 (1978).
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son calls the "inner core of the personality,"16 7 or what Tribe
calls "personhood."'6  When a person is secure in his privacy,
he is confident that his inviolate personality will not be in-
vaded by either government or private intruders.
If privacy cannot be defined solely in terms of place or infor-
mation control, then privacy must be the "separation from a
role and, tacitly, from an identity imposed upon oneself by
others via that role."169 A politician's office may be a private
"back region"17 0 when he converses there with his wife in his
private role, but the office ceases to be a private place when the
politician opens it for a public bill-signing or news conference.
The press is constitutionally protected to report on public
roles, particularly those of public officials.' 7 ' Yet to fulfill its
public function, the press must monitor not only the activities
of government, but also the activities of non-government insti-
tutions which increasingly affect the public welfare. Since the
Depression, the distinction between the government and the
private sector has been blurred because of the "rapid fusion of
economic and political power, a merging of science, industry,
and government, and a high degree of interaction between the
intellectual, governmental and business worlds."172 Much ac-
tivity in business, education, health-care and the professions,
which was once exclusively part of the private sector, is now so
intertwined with government and the public welfare that it
must be subject to public scrutiny fully as much as govern-
ment activity.
Scrutiny of public figures, however, does not extend to pri-
vate roles. When one is exercising a private role, he should
feel free to let down the guard he must maintain while con-
167. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 562 (1970).
168. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 886-985 (1978). Beaney prefers to
call the right of privacy the right of personality because of the suggestion in the word
"privacy" of remoteness or aloofness. One does not necessarily seek separation from
others when he seeks privacy. Privacy protects "certain aspects of the individual per-
son"; privacy protects "human dignity." Beaney, The Right of Privacy and American
Law, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 253, 254 (1966).
169. B. Schwartz, The Social Psychology of Privacy, 73 AMER. J. or SocIOL. 741, 747
(1968). See also INGHAM, PRIVACY AND PSYCHOLOGY IN PRIVACY 49 (J. Young, ed., 1978):
"the maintenance of privacy of a psychological nature depends on the acceptance of
the roles being presented in a particular social episode."
170. E. GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 66-86 (1958).
171. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). See T. EMERSON, supra note 167, at 6-9;
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245; W. BERNS,
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1976).
172. Curtis Publ. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
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ducting public business. In private moments a person may
share intimacies without fear that they will later be revealed to
the public. In private relationships, often characterized by un-
questioned trust and sharing among family and close friends,
one does not have to be responsible for his every action, be-
cause there is an unspoken confidence that even the most out-
of-character behavior will not be transmitted outside. In truly
private circumstances, usually in the home, though not always,
the personality is at once most at ease and most vulnerable;
social distance is slight; the formal relations of the business
world are replaced with spontaneous intimacy, and even the
most well-known public figures shed their accountability.
When one is conducting public business, however, social dis-
tances increase while privacy diminishes, even in quasi-private
places such as offices. Much of the increased social distance
and loss of privacy is a result of institutional constraints. As
organizations grow, jobs become more specialized; the per-
sonal warmth and consideration essential to private relation-
ships are replaced with mandated responses based on status,
rank, salary, longevity and prestige.'7 3 An element of coercion
often intrudes into business relationships. Even close working
relationships in an organization are often tempered by the fact
that one party has the power to hire, fire or impede the promo-
tion of another. Smooth working relationships in government,
business and the professions are often based more on mutual
benefit than on the intimacy and spontaneous trust of truly pri-
vate relationships. An "inviolable rule" for people "on the way
to success" is to "[m]aintain an impersonal attitude."'7
A person exercising responsibility for others cannot operate
173. For example, Likert found that 85% of the supervisors in one large organization
believed their subordinates felt free to talk about the job with the boss. Only half the
subordinates shared that belief. In one organization all the vice presidents practiced
an "open-door" policy which they felt was an effective channel of communication to
subordinates, but only 20% of the subordinates agreed. G. GOLDHABER, ORGANIZA-
TIONAL COMMUNICATION 103 (1974).
174. ESQUIRE'S GUIDE TO MODERN ETIQUETTE 223 (1969) (original emphasis omit-
ted). "You know that you can't choose and discard working associates as you do
friends, so you finally figure out that the safest road is to be pleasant but faintly re-
served with everybody during office hours." Id. at 223-24. Another etiquette book, L.
MILLER, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETIQUETTE 52 (1967) remarks: "All behavior during a
business call is governed by the simple truth that someone is paying for the time of
both parties."
The purpose of an organization is "to create a logically ordered world," and the or-
ganization tolerates personal and private matters only insofar as failure to account for
them will interfere with the smooth functioning of the organization. See Argyris, The
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with the spontaneous intimacy and trust of one in a private re-
lationship. Business colleagues or reporters who expect per-
fect candor from those conducting public business will always
be sorely disappointed. A person in a position of responsibility
will necessarily be less straightforward than he might be in
more personal relationships.' Not all would agree that a per-
son who holds a position of responsibility to the public must
abandon the scrupulous morality one may expect in private re-
lationships. 76  However, it is easy to think of situations in
which a leader, who might never deceive personal friends,
would be irresponsible if he were not deceptive in his public
capacity.177 One does not have to be cynical to agree with I. F.
Stone's conclusion, reached after many years of Washington
D.C. journalism, that the first rule to remember when reporting
is that all governments lie.17 The same could be said of any
institution or organization. Therefore, if one of the parties to
public business should occasionally make a secret recording in
order to corroborate his version of a conversation, there is no
intrusion into privacy. Where the atmosphere is already per-
meated with a defensive skepticism, if not widespread cyni-
cism and distrust, a participant in a business conversation runs
the risk that what he says may be heard in other places.
Relations between reporters and sources also illustrate the
social distance imposed by institutionalized roles. No matter
how close a reporter may be to a source, the shared confi-
dences and secrets are more a reflection of mutual need and
countervailing powers than of private intimacy.. When a re-
porter agrees to go "off the record," he is not showing an under-
standing of his source's need for maintaining the internal
privacy of his organization. Nor is he necessarily agreeing with
Individual and Organization: Some Problems of Mutual Adjustment, in STUDIES IN
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND MANAGEMENT 568 (D. Parker, et al., 3ds. 1971).
175. See R. NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY 1-22, 83-112 (1932). "Often
we find that if the principal ideal aims of an organization are to be achieved, then it will
be necessary at times to bypass momentarily other ideals of the organization, while
maintaining the impression that these other ideals are still in force." E. GOFFMAN, THE
PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 29 (1958).
176. See S. BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 165-81 (1978).
177. For example, would it have been "moral" for President Roosevelt to admit can-
didly the vulnerability to attack of the West Coast of the United States the day after
the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor? Can a president trying to free countrymen held
hostage in a foreign country be completely open about the course of action he might
follow?
178. I.F. Stone's Weekly, broadcast by WNYC-TV, New York City, 1973.
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the goals of his informant. A reporter's willingness to keep a
source's off-the-record confidences is based at least in part on
expedience. Even a reporter who admires his source and con-
siders him a friend needs confidential background information
to make his stories more accurate; the source needs publicity
to promote his policies. 1 79 If a reporter should secretly record a
conversation with a friendly source during a business conver-
sation in a "private" office, a working friendship and trust may
be broken, but privacy has not been invaded. The personality
of the other has not been violated. A relationship founded on
strategic advantage cannot be "private."
Even the doctor-patient and the lawyer-client relationships
are not private. A professional-client relationship involves an
authority figure and a subordinate, where the exposure of per-
sonality at the heart of privacy has little if any part. When a
professional is carrying out his duties, he is not free to engage
in the informal sharing that characterizes a private relation-
ship.' Indeed, most doctors will not practice medicine on
close relatives because personal concerns emanating from the
physician's private life might interfere with professional judg-
ments. A professional performing his duties operates under a
responsibility to his client, to his profession and to the state.
In short, a professional has an obligation to the public much
like that of a public official or public figure conducting public
business.
In a professional-client relationship, it is strictly the privacy
interest of the client which is protected by law, not the shared
interests of two people who are engaged in the mutual give-
and-take of a private relationship. If a doctor's patient or a law-
yer's client wishes to waive his right of confidentiality, he is
free to do so, although the professional is not.' The privilege
179. See L. SIGAL, REPORTERS AND OFFICIALS, 84-85, 111-15 (1973).
180. In Goffman's terms, we reach a "working consensus," a kind of shared expecta-
tion, which makes relationships with others run smoothly:
It is to be understood that the working consensus established in one interac-
tion setting will be quite different in content from the working consensus es-
tablished in a different type of setting. Thus, between two friends at lunch,
reciprocal show of affection, respect, and concern for the other is maintained.
In service occupations, on the other hand, the specialist often maintains an
image of disinterested involvement in the problem of the client, while the cli-
ent responds with a show of respect for the competence and integrity of the
specialist.
E. GOFFMAN, supra note 170, at 4.
181. Montgomery v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 Ark. 502, 508, 439 S.W.2d 299, 303 (1969);
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of confidentiality in professional-client relationships is an insti-
tutionalized protection against dissemination by the profes-
sional of intimate information about the client. Thus, if a client
wishes to make a tape of his relations with a professional, he is
not violating a relationship that could truly be called private.
In fact, participant monitoring may be the only method by
which a patient or client can acquire the evidence necessary to
bring charges against a wealthy, established professional who
extorts, rapes, abuses, propositions or otherwise violates his
trust to his client.18 2
B. Public versus Private Information
Not only are public business relationships lacking in privacy,
but most of the information involved in public business trans-
actions is not private either. Public persons and professionals
deal with private information. Records of employees' and cli-
ents' health and personal affairs are so intimate that people
with control over these records are compelled by law not to re-
veal them to the public.183
People v. Gerold, 265 Ill. 448, 481, 107 N.E. 165, 178 (1914). See generally 81 Am. Jur. 2d
Witnesses §§ 263-64 (1976). Professionals other than "quacks" like Dr. Dietemann have
claimed a right of privacy in their dealings with clients. See Dietemann v. Time, Inc.,
449 F.2d 245 (1971) involving an article by defendant magazine entitled "Crackdown on
Quackery" (Nov. 1, 1963) depicting plaintiff as a quack and including pictures of him
taken at his home "previous to his arrest on a charge of practicing medicine without a
license, and the other taken at the time of his arrest." 449 F.2d at 246.
A Minnesota social worker, who was secretly recorded in her St. Paul office, filed a
Petition for Rulemaking with the FCC claiming she was portrayed falsely about her
willingness to bend rules requiring a physician's examination before a person could be
committed to a state institution. After the recording was broadcast on a Minneapolis
television station, the social worker asked the FCC to change Rule 73.1206 so that prior
consent must be obtained from all parties to any conversation taped for broadcast, not
just telephone conversations as Rule 1206 now requires. RM-2564, filed June 20, 1975.
This author believes the social worker might have a libel or false-light tort claim, but
that the secret recording in her office about how patients are committed to institutions
was not an invasion of privacy. What if social workers are bending the rules? How can
the media document the problem for the public?
A lawyer failed in his claim of privacy invasion against a newspaper which had
placed a recording device on one of the lawyer's clients with his permission in order to
gain information during a conversation in the lawyer's office about the bribing of
judges. McCall v. Courier Journal, 4 Med. L. Rptr. 2337 (Cir. Ct. Ky. 1979). Cf. Osborn
v. United States. See note 75, supra. An Illinois appeals court ruled that when a po-
liceman is filmed at a massage parlor by a hidden camera placed there with the con-
sent of the owner and the masseuse, he has no claim to an invasion of privacy if he is
on the premises for the purpose of discharging his "public duties." Cassidy v. Ameri-
can Broadcasting Co., 60 Ill. App. 3d 831, 838, 377 N.E.2d 126, 132 (1978).
182. See note 100 and accompanying text, supra.
183. For example, the federal Freedom of Information Act allows withholding of
However, much of the information a public official, business-
man or professional might wish to keep from the public is not
so much "private" as it is secret or confidential. Unlike private
information, secret and confidential information does not bear
on the personality.' 4 The law bars governmental release of
trade secrets and classified information 5 not because of a con-
cern for privacy, but because public disclosure could jeopard-
ize the competitive position of a company or the security of the
nation. These are important concerns, but not part of privacy.
Unlike most private information, secret information does not
"belong" to its guardian. Secret information belongs to the cor-
porations or agencies which it affects. Ultimately it belongs to
stockholders and to the public.'""
Of course, institutions cannot survive if those who work in
them can have no confidential conversations.8 " Federal stat-
utes recognize the need for free discussion among public pol-
icy makers if the full range of alternatives is to be
considered.' 8 Often, internal memos, position papers and con-
versations are off-hand, casual or heuristic and do not reflect
the writer's or speaker's true views. To mandate disclosure of
such internal debates, whether conducted orally or on paper,
would inhibit free discussion and greatly narrow the range of
possibilities considered before a decision is made in govern-
ment or business.
Yet, the revelation of confidential information from within a
government or business organization is not usually an intru-
sion into privacy. A person participating in public business
may regret that his tentative position finds its way prematurely
into the public domain, but the public figure suffers no loss to
"personal and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Freedom of Information Act of
1967, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (6) (1976)). The Privacy
Act of 1974 forbids disclosure of such personal information. Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat.
1896, (1974) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976)). See also The Sunshine Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1976)).
184. Freedom of Information Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (1967) (codi-
fied at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (4) (1976)).
185. Id.
186. See Shils, Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
281, 283, 285 n.8 (1966).
187. B. Schwartz, The Social Psychology of Privacy, 73 AMER. J. OF SocioL. 741, 744
(1968).
188. E.g., the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (5) (1976): "inter-
agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters which would not be available by law to a
party other than an agency in litigation with the agency" are not an open record.
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his personality. He suffers, rather, another jolt of public life.
For better or worse, leaked information about public persons'
intra-office statements constitutes much of the robust debate
in democratic society. Leaked information, prematurely re-
leased reports and confidential conversations secreted to the
press are part of a vibrant, if ungenteel, free society: "Leaks
are an escape valve which allows government officials, high
and low, to release the bureaucratic poison which builds up in
the system. Leaks usually have a purging effect. Corrupt boils
are lanced. Festering secrets are exposed to the light."18 9
Leaked public business, whether acquired through unmarked
envelopes or secret recordings, is inevitable in a free society.
Statutes attempting to prohibit participant monitoring of pub-
lic business are not only unnecessary but would deny the
press an important investigative tool of ultimate benefit to the
public.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
when ordering the public release of certain Watergate tapes,
recognized the difference between "bedroom or other intimate
conversations" which were too private to be made public, and
secretly taped "conversations between business associates ad-
mitted into evidence as proof of criminal conduct" which could
be released to the public.o90 No doubt participants in White
House conversations considered them to be confidential. But
the taping and release of such business conversations dealing
with the abuse of public power would not constitute an inva-
sion into the solitude, repose and autonomy that even an un-
convicted felon can claim as a right to privacy.
Revelation of the White House tapes brings to light the cor-
rupt way in which public business was transacted in private
189. A. Latham, Book Review, 228 THE NATION 497, 498 (May 5, 1979) (Confessions of
a Muckraker, Anderson & Boyd).
190. United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom.
Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 591 (1978). In its reversal, the
Supreme Court did not balance the President's privacy claims against the interest in
public disclosure, but deferred instead to the Presidential Recordings and Materials
Preservation Act of 1974, § 104, Pub. L. No. 93-5 (1974), (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 2107
(1976)), which prescribed ways for disseminating tapes revealing the abuse of power.
Id. Both the Presidential Records and Materials Preservation Act and its accompany-
ing regulations provide for public access to secretly recorded Watergate tapes re-
vealing abuses of government power while providing for the withholding of
information which may be no more embarrassing but which would reveal private mat-
ters. See Presidential Recording Act, supra, at §§ 104(a)(1), (5). See also 41 C.F.R.
§§ 105-63.402-1, and 105-63.402-2(b) (2) (1978).
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places. Members of President Nixon's staff no doubt were dis-
appointed to learn that their boss had secretly taped their con-
versations. But whatever their disillusionment with their
employer, neither the White House staff nor the President had
a legitimate claim to privacy in the recordings of public busi-
ness. Neither the content of the conversations nor the busi-
ness relationship among the participants could be called truly
private.
A reporter, like any private citizen, may sometimes have in-
formation that he chooses not to release because he thinks it
might be detrimental to the public. Generally speaking, how-
ever, it is not the press's role to base publishing decisions on
the imagined repercussions of its stories. It is the historic role
of the press, when it uncovers information, to publish it.19 1
Where the press has acquired secret information and failed to
report it, either out of deference to government wishes or out
of sympathy for some participant in public business, neither
the government nor the public is necessarily well served. 19 2
The operatiAg principle of the press is that information relating
to public business belongs in the public domain. Tape record-
ers, used occasionally for participant monitoring of public busi-
ness, serve the public function. It is not a question of the
press having a First Amendment right superior to a right of
privacy. Rather, it is a question of the press, or another private
citizen or any other participant in public business, docu-
191. The struggle for constitutional government, for the extension of the
franchise, and particularly for the freedom of the press, which was both an
instrument and a symbol in the war against government as a private affair of
the monarchy and aristocracy, was directed against privacy in government.
Almost as much as the extension of the franchise and constitutional restraint
on monarchical absolutism, publicity regarding political and administrative af-
fairs was a fundamental aim of the modern liberal democratic movement. The
demand for the publicity of governmental affairs was attended by a demand
for the protection and reinforcement or privacy in other spheres-a demand
which was itself the child of the aspiration for individual liberty.
E. SHLS, THE TORMENT OF SECRECY 23 (1956).
William Jennings Bryan lamented to reporters upon his retirement as Secretary of
State: "I have been like an old hen. My secrets have been my chickens which I was
seeking to protect with my wings while you were trying to get them out from under
me." Villard, The Press and the President, 111 (N.S. 89) CENTURY MAGAZINE 193, 198
(Dec. 1925).
192. The New York Times withheld publication of information about the imminent
invasion of Cuba. Had the newspaper published its information and caused the can-
cellation of the Bay of Pigs invasion, an American embarrassment might have been
averted. See A. SCHLESINGER, A THOUSAND DAYS 261 (1965).
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menting transactions where legitimate privacy claims cannot
be made.
Conclusion
The proposition that an individual may secretly record the
conversation to which he is a party when public business is
being transacted is not morally uplifting. Neither is the under-
lying principle that one cannot always trust his auditor. But if
participant monitoring does not add to the trust one feels in his
public and professional relationships, neither does it necessar-
ily detract. The surreptitious use of tape recorders has not cre-
ated the distrust many feel towards government, business and
the professions. The deceptions, lies and one-upmanship prac-
ticed by too many people conducting public business have
taught the public that one cannot always believe what one is
told. Some of this deception is the inevitable result of the insti-
tutionalized roles imposed upon those who conduct public
business. Whatever the major reasons for the less than inspir-
ing conduct in much of American public life, the limited and
infrequent use of participant monitoring is at most a minor
contributing factor. On the other hand, participant monitoring
by the press and private citizens has an impressive record of
documenting fraud, deception, harassment and official leth-
argy.193 The prohibition of participant monitoring of public
business, in order to protect privacy, assumes in public busi-
ness transactions privacy interests that are nonexistent.
193. The investigation into pederasty by Channel 13 in Houston was conducted in
part because it was felt police had been reluctant to believe the extent of the problem
or to take action against it. Telephone interview with John Kells, a producer of Boys
for Sale, July 9, 1979. As a result of Channel 13's broadcast several pederasty suspects
were arrested and a special police unit was established to investigate. Id. NBC's in-
vestigation of fraudulent land offers in Florida, which included unannounced tele-
phone recordings, resulted in several prosecutions, the suspension of the licenses of
several land brokers and an agreement for refunds to several who bought land. Tele-
phone interview with Arthur Lord, NBC reporter for the Florida land fraud story, July
6, 1979. See note 153, supra.
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